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TO The Moon ... 
LROC NAC Lunar North Pole July 2009 
http l/lmc.sese esu edu/rtfNl8/?archlvesl71-Scann1ng-toward•the-north-
pole html 
NASA Mission: 
" ... to extend life to there, 
To find life beyond" 
*Copernicus from Lunar Orbiter 2, 
November 1966, 45 km altitude 
"Pictur• fran o e .... a Sys1em1 
p--tatlon111G6 
LRO Instruments 
- Topography 
• Slopes 
- Roughness 
FullOrtnt 
Autonomous 
LR: Laser Ra 
- Topography 
-Gravity 
FullOrtnt 
Autonomous 
7/14/2009 
2 
• 
I, 
LRO Orbiter 
R 
LAMP Requirements 
Lyman-Alpha Instrument with most contamination critical 
requirements: Internal Surface Cleanliness 400 A/20 
lfole to · 
. •. _c:.. f __:.___ . - -- . - - --------
•LAMP internal molecular 
requirements were exceeded 
upon delivery to GSFC. 
NVR swab yielded Level C. 
•LAMP chose to not re-clean 
their instrument and take the 
risk because internal witness 
plates performed at expected 
levels. 
LL: Ensure risks are discussed 
and agreed upon with other 
teams prior to Integration 
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LAMP Vacuum Pump 
Vacuum Ion Pump: "cleanroom approved" leaked small particles within 
cleanroom. PC picked up 300k 0.5um particles. Exceeding 10k room levels. 
Analysis indicated aerosolized oil (fluid loss). 
Action taken was to run vacuum line and exhaust outside of cleanroom. 
LL: Molecular contamination can show up as particulate. Plan ahead to 
remove pumps and exhaust from cleanrooms. 
ASO ISOAlft SYSHM 
.. 
V 
LRO Dally PC"s 
1,1•• P•fti&f• CuaH 
l 
t 
'it ::ct:!:::1!t;::±!:::::Jlt::::t! :::1,::::,:cj,=t:t!:t:::jl.!l;:'.t~!;;::::t:::::t::::t:;;;:t::; I I I I I I 
= = 
II t: II II 
-N.. .... •••...t• labTJ .. .... _ 
···--
II NMt (A10, ._ t...t• • • &H ValN ... tHn.t 
I.I NHI (A1.. - I V»aa• , ....... 11NN.I 
1rnhl, f.i -10.::11 ._......_ ••&II v.. •u 1fM1.I 
12 Ntfl HI .... e..&s :I• I.It YMM: LI Ht1t1.I 
tvst•ey ,11 .. , ..... ,~ ~-4 .... ,1e1 ......... 
, ....... .... 
LAMPMGSE 
Star Tracker Requirements 
LRO External Cleanliness Level Requirements for Sub-systems 
upon delivery to l&T was 450 A/2. 
• Star Trackers failed NVR Levels twice at Level C, B. 
• Star Trackers were wrapped in pink polyester 
• NVR FTIR data showed polyesters consistent with pink poly 
• Star Trackers failed NVR levels for both LRO and SDO projects. 
• Final cleaning and inspections eradicated NVR level failures. 
LL: Even though pink poly has been on a "do not use" list, vendors 
are still using it. 
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Silicones, Silicones, Silicones 
Nus ii Controlled Volatility (CV) 2946: Silicone Bonding Agent 
Contact Transfer was the main issue. NVR foils In curing tests showed no silicones 
Application Mitigation Techniques on Flight H/W: 
• Disposable Garments 
• Glove Change-out 
• Restricted Activity 
• Separate trash cans used/bags removed from cleanroom 
• CC person present 
Testing post cure showed no contact transfer 
Tayco Heaters: 
Acrylic adhesive but Pressure Sensitive Adhesive (PSA) slip agents contained silicones 
Cleaning would not remove silicones. Too late to change hee]a~ ~ ,------,,---=--,._ 
Application Mitigation Techniques: 
• Clean front side with Hexane 
• Use tweezers 
• Change-out gloves 
Kapton Tape: 
Analex screens tape for silicones 
Check labels for Analex testing 
Green Flash breaker Tape: Acrylic Adhesive 
TML 1.02 CVCM 0.25 Tayco produced Kapton Heaters 
Difficult to remove and not flight approved 
IFM 
So ar Array Gim a Ra iator 
Micro-Cracking,~.,,. ... , 
_, -- ---- --- -- - - - --- -- - - -- ----
• Thermal coating Silver Teflon (Ag/FEP ) 
micro-cracks affect thermal alpha 
properties as adhesive bleeds through 
the cracks; UV light photo-polymerizes 
and blackens the adhesive. 
• Micro-cracks found on substrate are 
typical for bended applications. 
• Infinity Microscope (IFM) analyses 
found little micro-cracks. 
• Affect of UV radiation on thermal 
properties was ascertained on a sample. 
LL: Beneficial uses of IFM and Dino-Lite 
in the field to check for microscopic 
damage. 
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LOLA Radiator NS43C 
LOLA's NS43C coated Radiator had 
damaged coating on outer edges 
Thermal ascertained a touch-up was 
aesthetically needed and not 
performance driven. 
• The touch-up job performed at ASO on 
the Orbiter caused continuous flaking 
noted on the surrounding MLI. 
· • Initial cleaning of the coating did not 
eliminate the flaking. Continued cleaning 
kept pulling coating. Cleaned to original 
coating levels. 
• LL: No last minute aesthetic touch ups; 
Potential contamination risk from particle 
generation/flaking. · 
LRO Bagging Lessons 
•Contamination concerns required bagging the spacecraft for I& T testing 
•Access to the lift points became a significant concern 
•Lift points were well within bagged volume 
•Necessitated cutting large holes in bag for lifting operations 
•Sometimes jeopardizing the mechanical integrity of the bag 
•LL: Consider bagging needs when designing lift points on contamination 
sensitive payloads 
•Bagging during installation into the GSFC SES thermal vacuum chamber was 
required 
•SDO experience showed significant buildup of particles on their bag 
•Use of a thermal vacuum fixture surrounding the observatory made bag 
removal a challenge. Less than 1 ft clearance in some areas 
•Bag design provided by Joe Hammerbacher was removed with no issues 
•Bag incorporated modular pieces that could be removed separately 
•Bag removal incorporated the use of parachute cords to gain access 
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LRO Bagging Lessons - ASO 
-----------------Hrs«",' 
•Bag removal prior to encapsulation was performed in the middle of the night to 
limit the exposure of the observatory to contaminants 
•Removal of the bag was again challenging due to the stack of two 
payloads 
•Access was very limited due to risk of contact with either payload or the 
stand on which the fairing would be placed 
•Scheme was designed 
again using parachute cord 
to lift the bag vertically off 
the spacecraft 
•There were many 
meetings to address 
concerns about removing 
the bag with the limitations 
•Bag removal occurred with 
minimal difficulties in less 
than 1 hour 
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White House Cleanroom 
----------------:n"Ti".?\Y--:'7/f..:'"\'~, > 
•With space limited at GSFC, LRO was to be housed in brand new 100k facility 
known as the "white house" 
•LRO cleanroom requirement was class 10K cleanroom 
•A class1 Ok Laminar Flow Enclosure (LFE) was designed to house LRO in order 
to meet cleanliness requirements within available facilities 
•LFE is a laminar flow tent with no roof, HEPNULPA - carbon filtration(supply 
and return), with sufficient air flow to meet class 10k cleanliness levels 
•A similar LFE was successfully used by STEREO at ASO 
•The LFE provided significantly cleaner air cleanliness than the facility itself 
• The STEREO LFE was again used when LRO was transported to ASO 
•The time frame for LFE design, fabrication and installation was less than three 
months ' 
•LL: The small room used as a garment change room for the "white house" 
became an issue during LRO processing 
•Small size limited personnel entry rates, cause delays on entry 
•Small size created contamination risks due to lack of space for necessary 
garmenting and waste removal 
--- - -- -- . ---
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LFE Lesson Learned 
• ---------------t<=-~.,. ... ~~ ...... -
•LL: The use of the LFE provided a safe contamination environment for the LRO 
l&T program where no other facility was available and at significantly less time 
and cost than a new facility 
•LL: The motors used in this LFE to drive the fans were very loud however, and 
exceeded OSHA decibel exposure limits. 
•The fan speeds were reduced to meet OSHA sound limits with minimal air 
flow impact. Laminar flow was maintained 
•Despite the reduction, crane operations required the fans to be shut off due 
to the noise impact on lift safety 
•LL: The tent modular design allowed flexibility in tent entry, however, entrance 
into the tent for large items such as LRO still required removing the return wall 
•Removal of the wall required power to be cut off to the return wall 
•Power supply design required shutting down the supply wall as well if the 
return wall power was disabled 
•LL: The independent power for the LFE enabled the tent to continue to operate 
even if the White House facility failed 
•The LFE does not have an independent HVAC system, so humidity and 
temperature control is lost with failure of the room HVAC system 
•LRO temperature and humidity limits were occasionally exceeded in LFE 
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LFE Particle Data During Power Off 
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•Fans shut down from 16:02-17:22. Return wall was opened and ARONSON table 
brought into the room. 0.5µ counts rose to 13,703 (1 OK limit is 10,000 0.5µ 
particles.) (Used from Joe Hammerbacher • SGT} · 
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LFE Particle Data During Power Off 
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•Fans were shut down around 11 :50-12:20. The LRO spacecraft was rotated on the 
ARONSON table. 0.5µ particle counts rose to 10,659 (Used from Joe Hammerbacher - SGT) 
OSR Contamination 
----------------=· ',., 
•A blue cloth material provided by the vendor was required to protect the OS Rs 
from scratches 
•This cloth turned out to be a significant contamination source 
•Particulate: Cut edges created significant particles and fibers 
•Folding and "hemming" the edges reduced particulate contamination but did 
not eliminate these fibers 
•Molecular: Testing of the cloth revealed methyl silicone contamination in an IPA 
rinse (release agent used ori the threads of the cloth?} 
•After final cleaning of the OSRs atASO, 
spotting and smearing on the OS Rs was 
noted 
•Gentle swab cleaning of each individual 
OSR was necessary to remove visible 
contamination 
•LL: Less contaminating alternative 
methods/materials should be used to protect 
OSRs 
•Material standoffs, hard covers, other 
materials should be considered 
:f - - - --~-- - - - - -- - · - - --- - ----- -
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Fairing Clean Tents 
•The LRO observatory was transported to the launch pad already encapsulated 
per normal Atlas procedures 
•At the launch complex, the payload area of the Vertical Integration Facility (VIF} 
is not a cleanroom ' · · 
•Access into the fairing was required by ULA and the LCROSS project from both 
the mission unique doors as well as the boatail doors. 
•Full garmenting was required for this access 
•Exposure of cleanroom garments to the "unclean" area was not acceptable 
• Two mission unique door tents and four boatail door tents were designed and 
fabricated 
•The mission unique tents included a separate garmenting area, the bowtail 
tents did not 
• The requirements for all tents was class 1 OOK, however the goal for the 
mission unique tents was a 10K environment 
•All tents were operated well below the class 1 OK goal as measured by 
particle counter data monitored during activity within the tents 
Fairing Clean Tents 
•LL: The operation of these tents 
exceeded expectations and enabled the 
protection of the contamination 
sensitivities required by LRO 
•Future use of this design is 
recommended where 
contamination sensitivity is required 
•These tents exceeded all 
expectations on cleanliness 
operations 
•Provision for clean room garment 
use for these tents should be 
clearly worked out prior to 
operations 
Boatail Door Clean Tent 
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LRO Fairing Transport from ASO to VIF 
------------------"-" ~ <"'I< , 
• Particle counts were taken within the 
actual fairing and not just at the air supply 
•Believe this is the first data of this 
type for this fairing 
•Wireless capability provided real time 
monitoring and saving of the data 
•RF activity was approved for use by 
ULA, KSC and GSFC safety 
• Battery change out was required on a 4 
hour basis 
• Safety also approved use of battery 
system on transporter 
•Transport stop points provided battery 
change points (5 minutes to change} 
• Counts show clean air after ECS system 
settled 
Particle Counter 
Lighthouse's SOLAIR 
3100+ used to monitor 
fairing air during 
transport 
LRO Fairing Transport from AS.O to VIF Or 
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•Counts show fairing interior met cleanliness requirements after ECS system settled 
•New RF capability provided this information/analysis prior to fairing hoist into VIF 
•Fairing environment meets cleanliness, caution should be used on ECS startup 
--- - - . ·- ·- ·---·-
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Other Lessons 
-------------=---~.:!"~)..:~-" 
•ULA reluctant to accept IEST particle counting for Level 450 Cleanliness 
Requirements 
•Cleanliness in the fairing verified by 450 PAC equivalent 
•Cleanliness easily met LRO requirements 
• 
•Instrument teams familiarity with cleanliness requirements and procedures 
was sometimes more limited than indicated 
•More assistance was required than originally anticipated 
.•Creation of a Purge Engineer position within the contamination group for this 
project was a dramatic benefit 
• limely access to someone familiar with, and able to make changes to the 
LRO purge system 
•Greater understanding of the needs both of the purge system and the 
spacecraft 
•Greater flexibility in purge system tweaking and alteration to meet 
changing needs, particularly at the launch site 
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Launch Site Purge Problems 
• 
• Gas sampling from the tube bank passed, but sampling downstream at 
the PLF (Payload Fairing) failed 
- H20 levels were not meeting instrument specification 
• Purge suitcase located in the PVAN (van allocated for S/C GSE) • 
- Upstream of 3oo+ft of Stainless Steel tubing 
- SS flex hoses braided over PTFE teflon lines used at several locations along 
the 3oo+ft 
• 50-7sft worth offlex hose 
• Permeability of PTFE was seen as the likely cause for high moisture content 
• LRO/CC considered the installation of an additional Aeronex purifier on 
the Atlas MLP (Moveable Launch Platform) Mast the best way forward 
- To be installed in-line downstream of the ULA particle 5µm filter -3ooft 
downstream of the PVAN 
- The closest location you can get to the PLF interface 
Aeronex Purifier 
• ----------------------------......... ....-.--
• Entregris Aeronex purifier CE-100KF-l-4R used to purify 
GN2 gas to 99.999999% purity 
- Removes 02, H2, CO, CO2, and H20 to sub ppb (part-per-
billion) 
• Selected for its oxygen removal capability 
- Oxidation sensitivity to mirror coatings inside the LAMP 
instrument 
- Part of the ' Inert' gas series which uses a nickel oxide catalyst 
which reacts to, remove the oxygen and other contaminates 
• Previously used on New Horizons for the ALICE instrument 
- ALICE is heritage Lyman-Alpha UV instrument for LAMP 
' 
7/14/2009 
! 
\ 
13 
Purifier Installation Obstacles 
• 
_________________ ,,. ,..,...,._ . 
• Short turn around time on flight configuration request 
- Large amounts of paper work and trails for such a change 
• "Spontaneously combustible" label identified on the purifier raised 
concerns and resistance 
- Passive purifier not identified on the MSPSP 
- Several ERBs (Engineering Review Boards) were conducted to justify its 
implementation and address any potential safety concerns . 
- Study by manufacturer showed any hazards to be limited to flowing incorrect 
gas through the purifier 
• In the extreme scenario where air was flowed through an 'inert' purifier at a maximum 
rated flow rate showed an very high heat up of the cartridge but no combustion 
occurred"__..,....., ..... ....,..,_,..,,_,,,......,_.,........,,.,.._,...,...__111e1 
- Time constraints and reluctance led to a compromise to use a non-reactive 
version which would purify the high moisture content found in the lines 
Lessons Lea-rned 
______________ ,,,......,_._ .. ~ 
• Conduct sampling as soon as possible 
- Need tube bank ordered and in place 
- Keep parties involved aware of any potential co~tingencies 
• 
• Work early with L VC (Launch vehicle Cont ractor) to strive to get 
t he purge system set-up as downst ream as possible 
- Atlas V Vertical Integration Facility (VIF) level 5 is a ve'ry active area 
post PLF mate . 
• Don't rely on herit age and contractually delivered items when it 
comes to safety 
- Identify all components (including passive GSE components) to safety 
along with their MSDS 
• Ensure its documented on the MSPSP for any potential launch site issues 
- Consider safety hazards based on the location of possible use 
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